India’s tribunal reform discourse often treats digitisation as a question of introducing e-filing, virtual hearings, and online access to basic case information.
Anshuman Sahoo
by Anshuman Sahoo
Core Problem: Weak economic scrutiny at the appellate level limits effective review of Competition Commission of India (CCI) decisions, eroding the quality of competition enforcement
Mean reduction in economic reasoning score (CCI → NCLAT)
Issues where NCLAT reasoning was weak on economic and legal counts
Compression in the most complex multi-market leveraging cases
The study reveals a systematic ‘economic-analytic compression’ as cases move from the CCI to the NCLAT with the appellate tribunal routinely failing to engage with the economic substance of competition findings. NCLAT reasoning scored lower in 25 of 35 issue-pairs examined, with the most complex multi-market cases suffering the sharpest drop.
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
India’s tribunal reform discourse often treats digitisation as a question of introducing e-filing, virtual hearings, and online access to basic case information.
India's regulatory appellate architecture rests on a foundational but underarticulated premise that appellate review of expert regulatory decisions should be corrective rather than substitutive.
Legal disputes characteristically arise not at the settled core of doctrine but at its penumbra, where evolving economic and social realities strain inherited conceptual categories.
Digital platform markets challenge conventional modes of competition enforcement by amplifying feedback effects, cumulative advantage, and temporal irreversibility.
The real world is complex, and mostly beyond human comprehension. Even the simplest phenomena like birds flying in geometrically-shaped flocks, or termites coordinating to build castles matching the best of human architecture perplexes us, exposing the limitations of our cognition.
This blog examines the role of Information Utilities (IUs) in India’s Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code and argues that their current design and functioning exhibit instances of epistemic fragmentation.
Khushbu Shah
by Khushbu Shah
Core Problem: The Debt Recovery Tribunal system suffers from an ambiguous delay definition, summons-stage bottlenecks, and capacity constraints — resulting in disposal rates of only 15–20% across Mumbai DRTs.
Average disposal rate across Mumbai DRTs (2022–25)
Average disposal time vs 180-day statutory limit
Cases disposed within the 180-day window
Administrative data from three Mumbai DRT benches reveals systemic dysfunction: average case disposal time ranges from 1.67 to 2.87 years against a 180-day statutory target, with fewer than 7% of cases resolved within the prescribed timeframe. The paper traces delays to three compounding factors — unclear definition of delay, manual summons processes, and chronic vacancies that cascade into adjournments.
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
The Commercial Courts Act, 2015 was amended in 2018 to introduce, among other things, the Pre-Institution Mediation and Settlement (PIMS) mechanism under Section 12A.
In Catalyst Trusteeship Ltd. v. Ecstasy Realty Pvt. Ltd., the Supreme Court of India revisited a fundamental question under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
The Debts Recovery Tribunal Regulations, 2024 that were introduced on 21st September, 2024 (Regulations) lay down detailed procedural rules governing Debt Recovery Tribunals (DRTs)
The Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP), the municipal corporation of Bengaluru city, till recently, managed core urban municipal functions in Bengaluru, including property tax administration, building regulations, and licensing.
High-value debt recovery cases play a disproportionately important role in India’s financial system. While such cases reportedly constitute a very small fraction of the total caseload before Debt Recovery Tribunals (DRTs), they account for a dominant share of the total value of claims, prompting policy measures such as the creation of special DRT benches for cases above specified monetary thresholds.
When two statutes with strong and overlapping powers apply to the same situation, a conflict of authority is inevitable.
Satyansh Singh Parmar
by Satyansh Singh Parmar
Core Problem: The institutional design of NCLT is fundamentally misaligned with IBC objectives — its dual mandate over Company Law and insolvency creates structural conflicts that fuel delays.
Cases pending before NCLT (10-yr backlog at current rate)
Cases breaching the 14-day admission limit
Cases exceeding the 330-day CIRP ceiling
With ~30,600 cases pending and a projected 10-year backlog (Economic Survey 2025-26), the NCLT’s dual mandate is its greatest structural liability. The average admission time of 526 days and resolution time of 883 days reveal an institution whose design actively defeats the time-bound promise of the IBC. The paper traces this failure to conflicting procedural cultures between Company Law and IBC adjudication.
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) was built upon the recommendations of the BLRC committee led by TK Vishwanathan.
For almost a decade, the 14 day timeline under Section 7(4)1 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) was treated by the Adjudicating Authority(AA) as directive rather than mandate.
The proposal for a National Tribunal Commission (NTC) in India addresses a long standing structural issue that currently ties tribunals to their parent ministries.
India in the past few years has spent thousands of crores on digitalisation of courts through e-filling, virtual hearings or case management systems in District Courts, High Courts and the Supreme Court through the e-Courts mission mode project1.
The National Company Law Tribunal has recently conducted a recruitment process for their Law Research Associates (LRA) through a multi-tiered selection process notified in late 2025 for all benches throughout India.
The blog post attempts to examine the extent and nature of delays, highlighting that as of 2025, over 1,500 matters still remain pending before APTEL, some dating back more than a decade.
Sumit Kumar
by Sumit Kumar
Core Problem: The statutory promise of time-bound insolvency resolution is defeated not by law but by NCLT Kolkata’s structural constraints: capacity limits, dual jurisdiction, poor infrastructure, and inequitable bench time.
Avg cases listed per day across Court I & II
IBC cases exceeding 330-day statutory limit
Court II adjournments with no reason recorded
Using primary data from courtroom observation, disposed-case analysis, and a practitioner survey, the study documents an institution in paradox: the quality of judicial reasoning scored 3.78/5 (the highest metric), yet overall timeline performance scored 3.16/5 (the weakest). Eighty-three per cent of respondents rated timeline performance 3 or lower, while 73% attributed peak delays to the ‘during proceedings’ stage.
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) was created by Parliament as the adjudicating authority (AA) for India's corporate insolvency framework.
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Bill, 2025 is one of the biggest legislative interventions in India's insolvency framework since 2016.
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code of 2016 drew a 330 day outer ceiling for corporate insolvency resolution.
Discussions on technology in the judiciary today often centre around ambitious ideas. Artificial Intelligence (hereinafter AI), blockchain, Internet of Things (hereinafter IoT) and automated case management systems are regularly projected as the future of courts.
When people talk about India’s telecom story, the spotlight falls on 5G auctions, startups and big telecom companies. Fewer notice the small, specialised tribunal that regularly decides the rules those markets live by, the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT).
The Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) system, introduced under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (RDDBFI Act), was seen as India’s institutional answer to the inefficiency of the civil courts in handling financial disputes.
Sundaramurti Ramesh
by Sundaramurti Ramesh
Core Problem: IBC delays impose quantifiable economic harm on creditor recoveries, firm value and credit markets — but the sources of delay and the point at which costs become critical are poorly understood, limiting evidence-based reform.
Share of CIRP delay attributable to the tribunal
Empirical outer boundary beyond which recovery erodes
Fall in resolution probability per additional interlocutory application (AI)
Across 492 CIRP cases, the study shows NCLT accounts for 65% of total delay, with each interlocutory application reducing resolution probability by 22%. Beyond the empirically derived 1,084-day threshold, creditor recoveries fall by 18-20 percentage points. The IBC’s Macro Stress Index (MSI) also shows that the framework improved financial stability post-2017 (MSI –1.20) but COVID-era delays reversed gains (MSI –3.03).
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
When Parliament enacted the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), it did so with utmost urgency.
India’s insolvency infrastructure generates a huge amount of information, but most of it sits scattered across government websites in formats that are difficult to analyse.
Anyone who has tried to study how well India’s insolvency tribunals actually perform quickly encounters a frustrating paradox: the questions that matter most to policymakers are precisely the ones the available data makes hardest to answer.
Tribunals occupy a central position in India’s justice framework. Conceived as specialised adjudicatory bodies operating outside the traditional judiciary, they aim to deliver faster dispute resolution while incorporating subject-matter expertise.
The integration of artificial intelligence into legal decision-making is no longer speculative. Large language models (LLMs), trained on massive corpora of text and capable of sophisticated pattern recognition, now demonstrate unprecedented competence in core legal tasks such as extracting issues from pleadings, mapping statutory
India’s judiciary, a constitutionally mandated pillar of democracy, exemplifies a pure public good characterised by non-excludability and non-rivalry. This study examines judicial efficiency as public good provision, analysing empirical data from 2018 and 2024 to document a deepening crisis in access to justice.
Swikruti Mohanty
by Swikruti Mohanty
Core Problem: The NFRA’s statutory framework fails to realise its founding mandate of independent oversight of ‘public interest’ entities, while complete government dependence curtails fiscal autonomy.
Borrowings of private NBFCs-ML from banks — outside NFRA ambit
Structural reforms proposed across jurisdiction & funding
The paper exposes two critical gaps: an exhaustive-list approach to jurisdiction that creates regulatory blind spots (33.3 % of private NBFC-Middle Layer borrowings originate from public banks yet fall outside NFRA oversight), and a funding model fully dependent on government appropriations. Together, these undermine the regulator’s independence and effectiveness.
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
The digitisation of courts is often associated with increased procedural transparency and improved access to information.
The National Financial Reporting Authority was established in 2018 as a direct response to the Punjab National Bank Scam, to strengthen audit accountability and enhance investor confidence.
The National Financial Reporting Authority (NFRA) has recently decided to voluntarily pause its disciplinary proceedings while awaiting the Supreme Court’s verdict on the enforceability of its orders.
The Supreme Court of India issued a mandate in October 2023 directing all High Courts and Tribunals to facilitate hybrid hearings to ensure access to justice. The apex court ordered all state governments to provide the necessary funds, and high courts and tribunals to offer free Wi-Fi and adequate internet bandwidth within their premises for all users.
Abstract: India AI’s recent challenge for the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) for the audit ecosystem reflects an emerging regulatory interest in the potential use of AI tools to strengthen the National Financial Reporting Authority’s (NFRA) supervisory and enforcement capabilities.
Most debates on the deployment of artificial-intelligence (AI) in Indian courts these days focus on the visible and attention-grabbing concerns like hallucinated case law, presence of deepfakes in evidentiary records




On April 18th, the inaugural NIST cohort presented their capstone projects – Six deeply researched studies spanning the NCLT, NCLAT, DRT, DRAT, CCI, IBBI, RoC, and NFRA. There research and publications are given above.
The presentation were followed by further discussions with experts and mentors sharing the stage:
This BTS video is a small glimpse into the energy, commitment, and camaraderie that made the day what it was.
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