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A Unified Administrative Backbone for Betterment of Tribunals:Case for a National Tribunal Commission in India

I. Abstract

The proposal for a National Tribunal Commission (NTC) in India addresses a long standing structural issue that currently ties tribunals to their parent ministries. It has been 29 years since the first time the proposal of an independent body for administration was floated in the Judgement of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union Of India1. Then the proposal was again provided in Union of India v. R. Gandhi2 and again in the Madras Bar Association Cases but even after multiple proposals and recommendations such body is not conceptualized by the Government. By creating a unified cadre, India could transition from a fragmented system to a professionalized, independent adjudicatory body.
Currently, tribunals like the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), and National Green Tribunal (NGT) are administered by different ministries (example Ministry of Corporate Affairs or the Ministry of Law and Justice). NTC would act as an independent umbrella body for all administration related work such as appointment of members, regulating general staff, taking care of infrastructure and financial autonomy for all tribunals similar to the Federal Court of Australia’s administration or the HM Courts & Tribunals Service in the UK.
The Supreme Court has noted (L. Chandra Kumar and R. Gandhi) that it is legally problematic for a ministry to be both the litigant and the administrator of a tribunal. Also NTC offers a solution for the vacancy crisis which has been seen in various tribunals. A selection committee would maintain a rolling panel of qualified candidates, ensuring vacancies are filled months before they actually occur for every tribunal.
This blog makes a case for the National Tribunal Commission as it would provide a unified administrator to all tribunals than fragmented parent ministries.

II. Introduction

India’s Tribunals have been operating under the administration of ministries for decades. While the tribunals like National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) or Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) were designed for specialised and speedy justice, administrative hold over them is with the very ministries whose policies they adjudicate and in some cases, these ministries are a party in the cases. This raises serious questions over the independence of these quasi-judicial bodies3.

It is time for a structural evolution. The proposal for a National Tribunal Commission (NTC) in India addresses a long-standing structural issue that currently ties tribunals to their parent ministries. It has been 29 years since the first time the proposal of an independent body for administration was floated in the Judgement of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India4. Thereafter, judgements in cases such as Union of India v. R. Gandhi5 and Madras Bar Association Cases reiterated these suggestions but even after multiple proposals and recommendations, such a body was not set up. 

The proposal for a NTC is not just a reshuffle, it is a fundamental requirement for the independence of tribunals. Since these bodies exercise quasi judicial adjudicatory powers and decide disputes affecting legal rights, the principles of judicial independence must also apply to them.

III. Current Parent Ministry System

The current tribunal system in India is based on a model that is fundamentally at odds with the principles of judicial independence. The appointment and the funds of the tribunals are controlled by their parent ministry. 

Ministries are responsible for appointing members and paying their salaries and the same members are deciding the cases in which they are a party or deciding over a policy which is made by the same parent ministry.6

The current system of administration poses major roadblocks-

  • Principle of ‘Nemo Judex in Causa Sua’

A fundamental principle of natural justice states that ‘No one should be a judge in their own case’7. While in the current system, if a citizen or an entity wants to challenge a decision by the ministry by going before a tribunals whose members’ salaries, infrastructure, specialised staff, and even travel approvals are managed by the very ministry being sued, this creates a conflict of interest that is fatal to judicial impartiality and can impact public confidence in quasi-judicial bodies.

  • Doctrine of Separation of Powers

Indian democracy follows the Westminster model under which judicial independence and the separation of judicial power from executive are paramount. Whereas in practice, even after

multiple remarks from the apex court, the integrated system of executive and judiciary still operates as a tribunal.  In L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India (1997), a seven-judge bench raised concerns over the independence of quasi-judicial bodies. It can be inferred from the judgment that the apex court wanted a proper separation of powers rather than the current mix of the executive and the judiciary.

  • Dependence on Parent Ministry

In the landmark case of Union of India vs. R. Gandhi (2010), the Supreme Court identified a fundamental structural flaw in the way tribunals are managed in India. The Court observed-

“But in India, unfortunately Tribunals have not achieved full independence…When the Tribunals are formed, they are mostly dependent on their sponsoring department for funding, infrastructure and even space for functioning…Unless wide-ranging reforms as were implemented in the United Kingdom and as were suggested by Chandra Kumar are brought about, Tribunals in India will not be considered as independent.”

  • Secondary Duty given less priority

The parent ministries prioritise their primary executive functions , due to which tribunal administration is often given less priority resulting in delayed appointments, infrastructure and staffing challenges. Few examples are-

  1. NCLT Delhi Bench, one court did not have a hall from 2019 to 2024 which resulted in Court hall No. 5 and 6 working half days for 5 years. 
  2. Supreme Court in NGT Bar Association (Western Zone) vs. Union of India noted that NGT is operating with 7 members including one chairman, three judicial and three technical members, despite the mandate being a minimum of 10 members at all times.

1L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261.
2Union of India v. R. Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association, (2010) 11 SCC 1.
3Douglas McDonald-Norman, Arun K. Thiruvengadam,”Supreme Court holds the line against executive-legislative attempts to control tribunals” Supreme Court Observer, December 2025, Available at:https://www.scobserver.in/journal/supreme-court-holds-the-line-against-executive-legislative-attempts-to-control-tribunals/ Accessed on 7th March, 2026.
4L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261.
5Union of India v. R. Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association, (2010) 11 SCC 1.
6PRS, Law Commission Report Summary: Assessment of Statutory Frameworks of Tribunals in India, (2017) Available at: https://prsindia.org/files/policy/policy_committee_reports/Law%20Commission%20Report%20Summary-%20Assessment%20of%20Statutory%20Frameworks%20of%20Tribunals%20in%20India.pdf Accessed on 7 March, 2026.
7M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 8th edn., LexisNexis (2018).
8L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261.
9Union of India v. R. Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association, (2010) 11 SCC 1.
10 Ibid
11Siddhartha, Only 13 of 30 National Company Law Tribunal Work full time, Times of India,Oct, 2024, Available at: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/only-13-of-30-national-company-law-tribunal-courts-work-full-time/articleshow/114227225.cms
12NGT Bar Association (Western Zone) v. Union of India, WRIT PETITION(S)(CIVIL) NO(S).72/2025

13Prachi Bharadwaj, NGT Vacancies, SSC Online, July 2020, Available at: https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2020/07/24/ngt-vacancies-this-is-an-appalling-situation-notify-all-vacancies-in-one-go-within-10-days-sc-to-centre/
14Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act, 2007, Available at: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/15/contents Accessed on 7 March, 2026.
15
Sir Andrew Leggatt, Tribunals for Users: One System, One Service: Report of the Review of Tribunals (2001) Available at: https://adminlaw.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Response-to-the-Leggatt-Report.pdf Accessed on 7 March, 2026.

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