A Framework for the National Tribunals Commission

Tribunals form an integral part of the Indian justice system. Their failure to achieve the objective of efficient dispute resolution has led to widespread recognition of the need for administrative reforms of tribunals. The Union Government has attempted to achieve this by passing rules to rationalise and consolidate tribunal administration, but these attempts have been the subject of numerous challenges in the Supreme Court of India. Over the course of these challenges, the idea of creating a ‘National Tribunals Commission’ (NTC) to independently appoint, supervise, and administer tribunals has emerged as a solution. Various rulings of the Supreme Court over time have directed the Union Government to set up an NTC.

Through our papers, we are suggesting constitutional and institutional design considerations, in order to consolidate an independent body that will determine appointments, tenure, salaries and other such administrative functions for tribunals.

National Tribunal Commission: Institutional Design Considerations, June 2026

The report ‘National Tribunal Commission: Institutional Design Considerations’, examines the institutional design of a proposed NTC for India. India’s tribunals, established under the 42nd Constitutional Amendment, currently suffer from excessive executive control over appointments, tenure, salaries, and budgets, which has gradually undermined their independence.

The report analyses the existing constitutional landscape, noting that while High Courts hold supervisory jurisdiction over tribunals under Article 227, this does not extend to core administrative functions. The executive, meanwhile, retains disproportionate influence over tribunal functioning through parent statutes and ministerial allocations.

The NTC is proposed as an independent body to fill this gap by handling appointments, service conditions, budgeting, and performance evaluation of tribunal members free from executive interference. The report recommends that the NTC be established through legislation or a constitutional amendment, funded through the Consolidated Fund of India, and governed by a board with both judicial and technical expertise. The report argues that the NTC would complement the High Court’s functions rather than compete with it, institutionalising administrative independence while leaving the constitutional role of judicial superintendence firmly intact.

Read report here :

A Framework for the National Tribunal Commission

DAKSH’s draft paper, ‘A Framework for the National Tribunal Commission’ discusses relevant constitutional, organisational, and operational considerations, and identifies the framework required to enable the NTC to achieve its goals. The draft paper also recommends an implementation plan, factoring in pragmatic considerations.