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	<title>Sundaramurti Ramesh, Author at Daksh</title>
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		<title>The Performance and Institutional Design of Indian Tribunals: A Comparative Empirical Analysis (2021–2025)</title>
		<link>https://www.dakshindia.org/the-performance-and-institutional-design-of-indian-tribunals-a-comparative-empirical-analysis-2021-2025/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sundaramurti Ramesh]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2026 11:39:12 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Tribunals occupy a central position in India’s justice framework. Conceived as specialised adjudicatory bodies operating outside the traditional judiciary, they aim to deliver faster dispute resolution while incorporating subject-matter expertise.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.dakshindia.org/the-performance-and-institutional-design-of-indian-tribunals-a-comparative-empirical-analysis-2021-2025/">The Performance and Institutional Design of Indian Tribunals: A Comparative Empirical Analysis (2021–2025)</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dakshindia.org">Daksh</a>.</p>
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		<title>When Algorithms Meet the Bench: Large Language Models &#038; the Transformation of Judicial Decision-Making</title>
		<link>https://www.dakshindia.org/when-algorithms-meet-the-bench-large-language-models-amp-the-transformation-of-judicial-decision-making/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sundaramurti Ramesh]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2026 11:13:27 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>The integration of artificial intelligence into legal decision-making is no longer speculative. Large language models (LLMs), trained on massive corpora of text and capable of sophisticated pattern recognition, now demonstrate unprecedented competence in core legal tasks such as extracting issues from pleadings, mapping statutory</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.dakshindia.org/when-algorithms-meet-the-bench-large-language-models-amp-the-transformation-of-judicial-decision-making/">When Algorithms Meet the Bench: Large Language Models &amp; the Transformation of Judicial Decision-Making</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dakshindia.org">Daksh</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Cost and Efficiency of Judiciary as a Public Good</title>
		<link>https://www.dakshindia.org/the-cost-and-efficiency-of-judiciary-as-a-public-good/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sundaramurti Ramesh]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 27 Apr 2026 11:43:55 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>India’s judiciary, a constitutionally mandated pillar of democracy, exemplifies a pure public good characterised by non-excludability and non-rivalry. This study examines judicial efficiency as public good provision, analysing empirical data from 2018 and 2024 to document a deepening crisis in access to justice.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.dakshindia.org/the-cost-and-efficiency-of-judiciary-as-a-public-good/">The Cost and Efficiency of Judiciary as a Public Good</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dakshindia.org">Daksh</a>.</p>
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