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	<title>Daksh</title>
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		<title>The Court Inside the Court: How the Committee of Creditors Has Become More Powerful Than the NCLT Itself</title>
		<link>https://www.dakshindia.org/the-court-inside-the-court-how-the-committee-of-creditors-has-become-more-powerful-than-the-nclt-itself/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sumit Kumar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Jul 2026 08:43:10 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.dakshindia.org/?p=41340</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) was created by Parliament as the adjudicating authority (AA) for India's corporate insolvency framework.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.dakshindia.org/the-court-inside-the-court-how-the-committee-of-creditors-has-become-more-powerful-than-the-nclt-itself/">The Court Inside the Court: How the Committee of Creditors Has Become More Powerful Than the NCLT Itself</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dakshindia.org">Daksh</a>.</p>
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		<title>CIIRP: The Reform that Assumes the Problem is Already Solved</title>
		<link>https://www.dakshindia.org/ciirp-the-reform-that-assumes-the-problem-is-already-solved/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sumit Kumar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Jul 2026 07:39:17 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.dakshindia.org/?p=41313</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Bill, 2025 is one of the biggest legislative interventions in India's insolvency framework since 2016.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.dakshindia.org/ciirp-the-reform-that-assumes-the-problem-is-already-solved/">CIIRP: The Reform that Assumes the Problem is Already Solved</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dakshindia.org">Daksh</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Rupee Cost of One Adjournment: A Financial Analysis of Institutional Delay in India’s Insolvency Tribunals</title>
		<link>https://www.dakshindia.org/the-rupee-cost-of-one-adjournment-a-financial-analysis-of-institutional-delay-in-indias-insolvency-tribunals/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sumit Kumar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Jul 2026 07:21:35 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.dakshindia.org/?p=41282</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code of 2016 drew a 330 day outer ceiling for corporate insolvency resolution.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.dakshindia.org/the-rupee-cost-of-one-adjournment-a-financial-analysis-of-institutional-delay-in-indias-insolvency-tribunals/">The Rupee Cost of One Adjournment: A Financial Analysis of Institutional Delay in India’s Insolvency Tribunals</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dakshindia.org">Daksh</a>.</p>
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		<title>Effectiveness of Pre-Institution Mediation and Settlement under the Commercial Courts Act: A Data-Driven Analysis</title>
		<link>https://www.dakshindia.org/effectiveness-of-pre-institution-mediation-and-settlement-under-the-commercial-courts-act-a-data-driven-analysis/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Khusbu Shah]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Jul 2026 07:06:20 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[fellow]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.dakshindia.org/?p=41260</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The Commercial Courts Act, 2015 was amended in 2018 to introduce, among other things, the Pre-Institution Mediation and Settlement (PIMS) mechanism under Section 12A.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.dakshindia.org/effectiveness-of-pre-institution-mediation-and-settlement-under-the-commercial-courts-act-a-data-driven-analysis/">Effectiveness of Pre-Institution Mediation and Settlement under the Commercial Courts Act: A Data-Driven Analysis</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dakshindia.org">Daksh</a>.</p>
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		<title>Debt, Default, and Admission: The Supreme Court Clarifies Scope of Section 7 of IBC </title>
		<link>https://www.dakshindia.org/debt-default-and-admission-the-supreme-court-clarifies-scope-of-section-7-of-ibc/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Khusbu Shah]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Jul 2026 06:53:45 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.dakshindia.org/?p=41232</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In Catalyst Trusteeship Ltd. v. Ecstasy Realty Pvt. Ltd., the Supreme Court of India revisited a fundamental question under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.dakshindia.org/debt-default-and-admission-the-supreme-court-clarifies-scope-of-section-7-of-ibc/">Debt, Default, and Admission: The Supreme Court Clarifies Scope of Section 7 of IBC </a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dakshindia.org">Daksh</a>.</p>
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		<title>Procedure and Process: Key Features of the Debts Recovery Tribunal Regulations, 2024</title>
		<link>https://www.dakshindia.org/procedure-and-process-key-features-of-the-debts-recovery-tribunal-regulations-2024/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Khusbu Shah]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Jul 2026 06:33:21 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[fellow]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.dakshindia.org/?p=41207</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The Debts Recovery Tribunal Regulations, 2024 that were introduced on 21st September, 2024 (Regulations) lay down detailed procedural rules governing Debt Recovery Tribunals (DRTs) </p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.dakshindia.org/procedure-and-process-key-features-of-the-debts-recovery-tribunal-regulations-2024/">Procedure and Process: Key Features of the Debts Recovery Tribunal Regulations, 2024</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dakshindia.org">Daksh</a>.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>Digital in Form, Analog in Function: The Limits of Tribunal Digitisation in India</title>
		<link>https://www.dakshindia.org/digital-in-form-analog-in-function-the-limits-of-tribunal-digitisation-in-india/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Anshuman Sahoo]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Jul 2026 06:27:49 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[fellow]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.dakshindia.org/?p=41199</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>India’s tribunal reform discourse often treats digitisation as a question of introducing e-filing, virtual hearings, and online access to basic case information.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.dakshindia.org/digital-in-form-analog-in-function-the-limits-of-tribunal-digitisation-in-india/">Digital in Form, Analog in Function: The Limits of Tribunal Digitisation in India</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dakshindia.org">Daksh</a>.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>Appellate Review of Expert Regulators: Deference, Jurisdiction, and Scope</title>
		<link>https://www.dakshindia.org/appellate-review-of-expert-regulators-deference-jurisdiction-and-scope/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Anshuman Sahoo]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Jul 2026 06:20:32 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[fellow]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.dakshindia.org/?p=41188</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>India's regulatory appellate architecture rests on a foundational but underarticulated premise that appellate review of expert regulatory decisions should be corrective rather than substitutive.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.dakshindia.org/appellate-review-of-expert-regulators-deference-jurisdiction-and-scope/">Appellate Review of Expert Regulators: Deference, Jurisdiction, and Scope</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dakshindia.org">Daksh</a>.</p>
]]></description>
		
		
		
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		<item>
		<title>Legal Complexity and the Limits of Tribunal Adjudication</title>
		<link>https://www.dakshindia.org/legal-complexity-and-the-limits-of-tribunal-adjudication/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Anshuman Sahoo]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Jul 2026 06:12:24 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[fellow]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.dakshindia.org/?p=41177</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Legal disputes characteristically arise not at the settled core of doctrine but at its penumbra, where evolving economic and social realities strain inherited conceptual categories.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.dakshindia.org/legal-complexity-and-the-limits-of-tribunal-adjudication/">Legal Complexity and the Limits of Tribunal Adjudication</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dakshindia.org">Daksh</a>.</p>
]]></description>
		
		
		
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		<item>
		<title>Non-Disclosure of data in digital court system : Does tech make it easier to hide information?</title>
		<link>https://www.dakshindia.org/non-disclosure-of-data-in-digital-court-system-does-tech-make-it-easier-to-hide-information/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Swikruti Mohanty]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Jul 2026 05:59:08 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[fellow]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.dakshindia.org/?p=41161</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The digitisation of courts is often associated with increased procedural transparency and improved access to information.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.dakshindia.org/non-disclosure-of-data-in-digital-court-system-does-tech-make-it-easier-to-hide-information/">Non-Disclosure of data in digital court system : Does tech make it easier to hide information?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.dakshindia.org">Daksh</a>.</p>
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